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would like to start by focusing on the method and model 
used in the paper by Jean-Charles Rochet. In particular, I 
will consider some of the paper’s assumptions. This discussion 
will bring me to some specific remarks on Basel II, after which 
I will circle back and comment on Rochet’s policy conclusions.
I found the Rochet paper to be interesting, and I liked it very 
much. Speaking as a bank supervisor, I believe there is a clear 
need for more research in this vein, which as I see it is an effort 
to make the theoretical models of banking and bank super-
vision more realistic in various ways, thus in part to make their 
conclusions more influential. Most of the value I can add with 
regard to the model therefore is to focus on the assumptions 
that still seem somewhat at odds with what the world looks like 
from a bank supervisor’s perspective.
Foremost is probably the fact that the true economic value 
of a bank’s assets is not known with certainty. I believe the 
uncertainty associated with this economic value is qualitatively 
different than assuming that the assets’ liquidation value would 
be less than their economic value. This is part of the 
uncertainty, but not all of it. Obviously, there are some who 
believe that this problem should be addressed in practice by 
requiring mark-to-market accounting for banks. For those 
who follow accounting developments, moves in this direction 
by the International Accounting Standards Board—in 
particular, International Accounting Standard 39—have been 
receiving a great deal of attention. My only comment on this 
topic is to suggest that developing a fair-value accounting 
approach for the entirety of a bank’s balance sheet in the 
absence of liquid market prices for many of its assets is a 
challenge of the same—or possibly even greater—order of 
magnitude as the problem of the first pillar of the Basel II 
framework.
A second and closely related issue is the fact that the 
volatility parameter,  , that governs the underlying stochastic 
process for the bank’s asset value is itself unlikely to be known 
with certainty. Importantly, this uncertainty is not limited to 
outsiders. In considering models that are meant to apply to the 
largest global banks—which clearly has been a primary focus of 
Basel II—an important issue that must be grappled with is the 
sheer size and scope of the banks’ activities. For example, 
Citigroup has about 250,000 employees throughout the world. 
A critical risk management challenge for such a firm is simply 
to make sure that the head office receives accurate information 
on the activities of all its operations and that it has a plausible 
mechanism for seeking to actually influence the risk level of 
these disparate units.
In other words, I would argue that it takes considerable 
effort and discipline just to ensure that the level of a bank’s risk 
is transparent and controllable by insiders, much less outsiders. 
These points also lead me to conclude that the agency problems 
within large financial firms are absolutely critical to a complete 
understanding of how they should be managed and supervised. 
Moreover, if one looks at the list of financial scandals in recent 
years, it is clear that internal agency problems leading to 
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excessive risk taking by the overall firm in a manner that was 
not transparent to its own top management has played a key 
role in a number of these scandals.
Thus, I would propose an alternative interpretation of 
“shirking” to the one presented by Rochet: a bank is shirking 
when it fails to invest sufficiently in risk management and 
control systems and thus is unable to identify or control its 
overall level of risk properly. This leads it to make “bad” 
investments in the sense that such investments would not have 
presented an attractive risk-return trade-off had the bank 
accurately assessed the risk involved. It is not clear to me 
whether this change in interpretation would lead to a change in 
the model’s results, but it would be interesting to see.
I now turn to a discussion of Basel II, of which I have been a 
major participant and am therefore likely to be guilty of bias. 
Perhaps I have a unique view of Basel II and of capital 
requirements in general. To me, the essence of the project is the 
development of a largely comparable and comprehensive 
measure of risk, particularly credit risk. I believe that the 
approach to credit risk management is changing funda-
mentally, as demonstrated by the rapid growth of credit risk 
transfer markets involving participants other than banks. 
I do not think that we are likely to see a return to the days when 
global banks measured their credit risk by rules of thumb.
I believe that the need for a measure of credit risk that 
achieves greater comparability and greater comprehensiveness 
than the Basel I measure is of importance to supervisors and to 
the marketplace generally. Regardless of the outcome of the 
Basel II effort, I am convinced that something along these lines 
is both necessary and inevitable. In my view, common tools 
and a common vocabulary for expressing risk will be significant 
aids to the development of more liquid markets for the trading 
of credit risk. In this sense, it is reasonable to think of the 
supervisory development of the first pillar of Basel II as an 
effort to solve a marketwide collective action problem related 
to the development of a common measure of risk.
In addition, the prospect of Basel II is spurring significant 
investment in risk management by global banks. Many banks 
have obviously developed sophisticated risk management tools 
and approaches, but the level of rigor that has surrounded these 
calculations and the degree to which data have been retained to 
check and improve the accuracy of these systems are not where 
they need to be, given the scale and importance of these 
institutions.
There are two fundamental trade-offs at the heart of Basel II. 
The first trade-off is between flexibility and comparability. The 
second is between risk sensitivity and complexity. There is no 
easy answer to either of these trade-offs; veering too far in 
either direction has its costs, and there is no doubt that the 
resulting proposal lacks the formal elegance of the best 
economic models. But we are not designing an economic 
model. Rather, we are working to improve steadily the risk 
management capabilities of those financial firms in which 
significant weakness would no doubt be quite costly, and we 
are seeking to establish a considerably better overall measure 
of the risks taken by such firms. In undertaking such a project, 
I think there is no better alternative than a highly transparent 
and consultative process. The balances achieved on the 
aforementioned trade-offs reflect the outcome of this 
somewhat messy, time-consuming process.
The result will be far from perfect, but I believe quite 
strongly that it will be better than what we have today. In 
particular, one way in which it will be better is by providing 
a shared signal to supervisors, the market, and bank 
management that credit quality is deteriorating. The current 
framework essentially embodies no such signal and puts the 
onus on the reserving/charge-off decision instead. A risk 
measure that responds dynamically to changes in credit quality 
has the potential to alert bank management, supervisors, and 
others to emerging problems much more quickly than before. 
Like Rochet, I believe that a key focus of supervisory policy 
should be on designing frameworks that discourage 
forbearance and create incentives for addressing problems 
promptly.
As to the topic of Pillar 3 and market discipline, I must take 
issue with Rochet’s assessment based purely on “page count.” 
Indeed, I believe that at the heart of Basel II is the development 
of a risk measure. Step one of Pillar 3 is therefore disclosure of 
this risk measure, on which basis it would not be unreasonable 
to assign to Pillar 3 all of the pages devoted to Pillar 1. But this 
is a quibble. The key fact is that Pillar 3 of the Basel II proposal 
does not stop there. It requests disclosure of a number of other 
items that focus on credit concentrations, the components of 
bank capital, and other more detailed breakdowns of risk by 
portfolio. This is intended to provide greater and better 
information—more frequently—to market participants. 
Importantly, the current version of Pillar 3 reflects significant 
consultations and interactions with market analysts over what 
information they would like to have that banks are reluctant to 
provide willingly.
In this regard, it is worth emphasizing the point that 
determining what sort of information is most useful to disclose 
is not a trivial problem, particularly if the concern is to gauge 
in a forward-looking manner the risk to which a complex firm 
is exposed. Many of the analysts that I have spoken with have 
expressed some frustration with finding suitable ways to assess 
this risk on the basis of current financial statements. Personally, 
I wonder if this frustration has in some way been responsible 
for what appears to have been an overemphasis on the stability 
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In any case, I believe that trying to make publicly available 
better measures of firm risk is a critical part of trying to make 
market discipline more effective. I also believe that this is a 
potentially fruitful avenue for empirical research on, for 
example, the types of risk disclosures that would be the most 
useful indicators of true underlying risk.
I now turn to two of the policy conclusions of the Rochet 
paper. First is the conclusion that market information can be a 
useful tool in allocating scarce supervisory resources. This is 
not seriously disputed by anyone I am aware of. In the United 
States, bank supervisors are extensive users of information such 
as stock prices, debt spreads, KMV, and market costs of credit 
protection. This information helps inform the allocation of our 
supervisory resources. Although I should add that here at the 
New York Fed, we have long sought to have extensive direct 
market contacts in an effort to ensure that we are not behind 
those markets in terms of their views of key participants.
More broadly—and with several recent cases in mind—I 
believe that there has been a marked increase in the intensity of 
supervision that has occurred simultaneously for those firms 
that have seen their market spreads widen significantly. But 
from the perspective of academic research, I know that the 
question is, Why has there not been a greater effort or 
willingness to develop approaches that “hard-wire” 
supervisory reactions to market signals, in particular, the 
subordinated debt proposals that have been made?
In the United States, there has been extensive discussion 
and research on this subject, such as the Treasury/Fed study 
mandated by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. In many other 
countries, I honestly think there has been somewhat less 
enthusiasm. I believe this reflects concerns about giving up 
control as well as concerns about whether the underlying 
market signals are fully reliable—that is, that market prices 
may reflect excess volatility. But the concept has not been 
ignored, and I believe the supervisory community wants to see 
more research. In this regard, I commend to you a recent 
working paper by the Basel Committee’s research task force 
that discusses the existing markets for subordinated debt in the 
G-10 countries. The paper is available on the Bank for 
International Settlements’ website.
Specifically with regard to subordinated debt, my own 
concerns have always centered on the idea that the proposal is 
premised on the creation of a liquid market in a product that 
does not seem to be desired today in the quantity and frequency 
that some of the models imply are necessary. In addition, there 
is the observation that the subdebt holders have become the 
“de facto regulators” of the bank in various ways. But if that is 
truly the case, then again, as some recent scandals suggest, we 
need to worry significantly about the potential conflicts of 
interest between the de facto regulators and the regulated. 
We need to ensure that banks are not simply buying and 
holding each other’s subdebt in quid pro quo arrangements. 
We need to be able to police potential conflicts of interest 
between asset managers and the banks that provide custodial 
services for those asset managers. I do not believe that this 
would end up being so simple in practice.
However, the future may be brighter for credit derivatives. 
A downside is that these derivatives are typically written on 
senior debt. But the upside is that a relatively liquid market 
with standardized terms is emerging in which contracts on the 
largest global banks are among the most active products, in 
particular, to help these firms manage their counterparty risks 
with each other. Moreover, in the past six months, we have seen 
credit derivative index products grow significantly, potentially 
enabling the marketwide signal to be disentangled from the 
firm-specific signal. Again, I would suggest this as a fruitful area 
for empirical research that explores the possibilities of linking 
supervisory intensity or even specific supervisory actions to 
these market signals.
The second major policy conclusion I will discuss is the need 
for a greater focus on the harmonization of supervisory 
practices around the world. Again, this idea has a lot of appeal. 
In the United States, I think it is fair to say that the supervisory 
community generally believes that it does a reasonably good 
job on Pillars 2 and 3. In regard to Pillar 2, the view of U.S. 
supervisors is that the primary responsibility is for bank 
managers to determine what their desired level of capital is and 
how they want to allocate that capital, but that supervisory 
interaction—which benefits from having a window into the 
practices of a number of the major banks—with banks on those 
decisions is advantageous.
Frankly, a major part of the original U.S. impetus for Basel II 
was to help export our preferred supervisory concepts and 
approaches more broadly around the world. For example, we 
believe that a mix of supervision and regulation works better 
than a purely regulatory approach with little on-site presence. 
I believe that, in large part driven by the realities of their 
responsibilities under a Basel II regime, many other supervisors 
have been moving toward us in approach, in particular, in the 
view that quality supervision requires substantial investment in 
skilled staff with the ability to understand modern risk 
management methods.
Changing embedded institutional arrangements and 
eliminating political pressures will not happen overnight. 
Realistically, efforts to harmonize supervisory approaches 
should not be seen as a substitute for Basel II. From a practical 
perspective, a successful resolution to the Basel II negotiations 
will enhance the Basel Committee’s pursuit of further efforts to 
increase supervisory cooperation and converge supervisory 
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In conclusion, I agree very much with Rochet’s view that 
focusing more attention on supervisory practices and on 
market discipline would be extremely worthwhile. Further 
efforts to harmonize and improve supervisory practices 
globally are desirable. However, I do not share the author’s 
opinion that the Pillar 1 project is sufficiently unimportant that 
it could or should simply be abandoned. As I have said, the 
development of better risk measures is both necessary and 
inevitable. It is indeed largely inconceivable to me that the 
global capital markets could continue to develop over the next 
ten or twenty years in a way that avoids the need for such 
comprehensive and comparable measures of risk.
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